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Abstract: We use recent developments in the empirics of comparative case
studies to analyze the effect of binding emission targets under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol on the development of CO2 emissions of seven major Annex B countries.
In particular, we investigate whether committing to a specific greenhouse gas
emissions target had an effect on actual CO2 emissions of Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Japan by using a synthetic con-
trol approach. With the exception of Great Britain, we are not able to reject
the hypothesis that there has been no effect of binding emission targets on
actual emissions.
Keywords: Climate Policy, International Environmental Agreements, Kyoto
Protocol, Synthetic Control Method
JEL-Classification: K33, Q54
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1 Introduction
The international community persistently fails to agree on a uniform climate policy suc-
ceeding the Kyoto Protocol (KP).1 This has already become apparent during the climate
conferences in Copenhagen and Cancún in December 2009 and 2010. The last meeting
in Durban in December 2011 reiterates the two major impediments: First, emerging
economies, such as India and China, are not willing to commit to emission reduction
targets in the near future. Second, some industrialized countries (e.g., Canada, Japan,
and Russia) are no longer willing to accept restrictions on their greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. In spite of these obstacles, a renewal of the KP is considered as one of the few
solutions with at least modest chances to gain sufficient international support. However,
it is not clear whether a continuation of the KP – even if extended to include countries
in transition such as China, India or Brazil – is such a good idea. The key question
one might ask before considering a particular agreement to be prolonged or extended is
whether and to what degree it has been successful.
In this paper, we analyze whether the KP has lived up to its primary goal, the reduction
of GHG emissions in the industrialized world. We test for the existence of observable do-
mestic emissions reduction efforts in seven major Annex B countries. The main obstacle
to analyzing the effect of the KP on the emissions of Annex B countries is the iden-
tification of the correct counterfactual business-as-usual (BAU) emissions to which the
actual GHG emissions have to be compared. We construct BAU emission paths by em-
ploying a synthetic control approach, as introduced by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)
and Abadie et al. (2010). In this approach, the counterfactual for each “treated” country
(i.e., Annex B countries that ratified the KP and, thus, are subject to GHG emissions
targets) is constructed by a weighted average of “non-treated” countries (i.e., all coun-
tries without binding emission targets under the KP) such that the actual country and
its synthetic counterpart coincide as much as possible with respect to emissions before
the “treatment” (adoption of the KP) and in all relevant characteristics that are unaf-
fected by it. The difference of the emission paths of the actual country and its synthetic
counterpart following the treatment reveals the influence the binding emission targets of
the KP imposed on the development of domestic GHG emissions.
In our analysis we focus on seven major GHG emitters with binding GHG emission tar-
gets under the KP, namely Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy
1 In the KP the industrialized countries of the world, so called Annex B countries, committed themselves
to a reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 5.2% against 1990 levels over the period from
2008 to 2012.
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and Japan. We only consider changes in domestic GHG emissions for two reasons. First,
the KP explicitly obliges countries with binding emission targets to achieve their reduc-
tion goals primarily by domestic actions. Second, allowing for emissions trading among
treated countries and between treated and non-treated countries via so-called flexibil-
ity mechanisms imposes insurmountable obstacles to eliciting the treatment effect of
treated countries. While emissions trading among treated countries implies that the
stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) would be violated, emissions trading
between treated and non-treated countries would blur the distinction between treated
and non-treated countries.2
Among the seven countries under consideration, we only find a significant reduction of
GHG emissions compared to BAU emissions for Great Britain. Further, we can rule out
treatment effects for Australia, Canada, Italy and Japan. For France and Germany we
find a treatment effect but our inference analysis renders these effects insignificant. These
results are supported by the assessment of the “demonstrable progress reports”, which
all Annex B countries with binding emission targets under the KP had to compose in
order to communicate their progress in reducing emissions until 2005. Thus, at least for
the major polluters, we find little evidence for reduced emissions due to the KP.
Of course, we are not the first to challenge the KP. In fact, since its emergence in
1997 the KP has been heavily criticized. In December 1997 “The Economist” already
prognosticated that the USA will never be able to ratify the KP, as it would never
be approved by the U.S. Senate.3 Prins and Rayner (2007) criticize its inflexible top-
down architecture, which had been borrowed from past international treaties regulating
chlorofluorocarbons, sulphur emissions and nuclear weapons, and “was always the wrong
tool for the nature of the job.” Also the economics profession found little praise for the KP.
While Barrett (1998) argued from a political economy point of view that the KP hardly
deters non-participation and non-compliance, Copeland and Taylor (2005) criticize that
its design neglects important lessons from trade theory. Other authors animadvert the
level of the emission targets (e.g., Tol 2000) or discuss the challenges of the flexibility
mechanisms (Zhang and Wang 2011).
With respect to the analysis of the KP’s capability of reducing domestic GHG emissions
our paper is most closely related to Aichele and Felbermayr (2011). While they focus on
2 Our restriction on domestic GHG emissions also excludes emissions contained in traded goods (not
subject to regulation under the KP), which might overestimate the treatment effect. As a consequence,
omission is at most a concern for countries exhibiting a significant treatment effect.
3 The Economist (US edition): Global warming. Rubbing sleep from their eyes. Dec 11th 1997
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the effect of the KP on the carbon footprint,4 they also find a significant negative average
effect of ratification on domestic CO2 emissions. This result is somewhat at odds with
our result that the KP had no significant effect on the CO2 emissions of all countries
under investigation apart from the UK. The opposing results may stem from employing
different empirical techniques or defining a different treatment event. With respect to
the former, the differences-in-differences approach employed by Aichele and Felbermayr
elicits the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and their instrumental variable
approach captures the average treatment effect for all countries (ATE) in their sample. In
contrast, the synthetic control approach applied in this paper quantifies the treatment
effect for each treated country individually. We focus on the individual analysis, as
emission targets differ substantially among the treated countries (ranging from 72% for
Luxembourg to 125% for Spain compared to their 1990 levels). As different targets may
induce different effects on CO2 emissions, treatment effects are most likely heterogenous
and do not follow a common trend. With respect to the latter, Aichele and Felbermayr
use ratification of the KP as the treatment period. In contrast, we employ the adoption
of the KP in November 1997 as the time of treatment. We chose adoption, as at that
time emission targets for Annex B countries were already known and, thus, could already
have influenced countries GHG emissions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly summarize important facts
about the design of the KP. We start the empirical analysis in Section 3 by reporting
on the used data. We then contrast a classical differences-in-differences approach with
the synthetic control method to estimate the effect of a binding emission target under
the KP on the development of GHG emissions. The results are discussed in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Greenhouse Gas Emission Targets under the Kyoto Protocol
In the Kyoto Protocol (KP), initially adopted on 11 December 1997, 39 industrialized
countries (and the European Community), so called Annex B countries, commit to reduce
the emissions of four greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 5.2% on average over the period
between 2008 to 2012 compared to 1990 levels. It was open for signature between 16
March 1998 and 15 March 1999. Over this period the KP received 84 signatures. Of the
39 countries with reduction commitments, only Belarus, Hungary and Iceland did not
4 The carbon footprint of nations also accounts for emissions trading and for emissions through the
import and export of goods.
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sign the protocol (Belarus just joined the list of countries with reduction commitments
in November 2006). In addition to signature, countries had to ratify the protocol in order
to accede to it. Countries which did not sign the protocol during the signature period
were able to join it by ratification at any time later on.
For all countries under investigation we consider the adoption of the KP in December
1997 as the treatment event in our analysis – irrespective of their date of signature or
ratification. In fact, as the emission targets were already known in 1997, and with its
adoption the KP took the first hurdle to become enacted, we consider 1997 as the earliest
time at which the KP could have imposed a treatment effect.5
One might argue that in order to assess the effectiveness of the KP one would just have
to look at countries’ levels of compliance. As the commitment period ranges from 2008 to
2012, we yet lack final emissions data to assess the effectiveness of the KP with respect
to compliance levels. However, plotting GHG emissions as relative deviation from the
emission target over time for the ten largest GHG emitters facing emission targets under
the KP, we observe that countries split into three distinct groups (see Figure 1): (i)
there are countries which are already far below their emission targets (e.g., Russia and
Ukraine), (ii) countries that are above their targets but converge towards them (e.g.,
Germany and Great Britain) and (iii) countries that are above their targets and further
diverge from them (e.g., Australia and Canada).
We argue that the deviation from the emission targets is not a reliable indicator for
the effectiveness of the KP with respect to emission reductions. The reason is that
the business-as-usual (BAU) emissions – the GHG emissions that would have occurred
without the adoption of the KP – were uncertain when the emission reduction targets
were negotiated in 1997. Of course, these targets have been negotiated with expected
BAU emission paths in mind, but expectations do not necessarily have to prove true.
Moreover, expectations about BAU emissions may have been (almost) correct for some
countries and at the same time (drastically) wrong for others. As an example, consider the
countries within group (i). Countries in this group were predominantly members of the
Former Soviet Union (FSU). After the collapse of the FSU, these countries experienced
a severe economic downturn in the 1990s accompanied by a drastic decline in greenhouse
gas emissions. In spite of later economic recovery, GHG emissions in all these countries
are still far below their 1990 levels and they will definitely comply with their Kyoto
targets. Thus, neither does the convergence of a country towards its emission target
imply that it did a good job in reducing GHG emissions compared to its BAU emissions
5 Of course, results would still be consistent if the treatment effect started later on.
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Figure 1: Development of the deviation of greenhouse gas emissions relative to the Kyoto
Protocol target in percent from 1990–2007 for Australia, Canada, Germany,
France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, Russia and Ukraine.
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nor does the divergence of a country from its emission target indicate that the country
did not significantly cut down GHG emissions compared to the BAU paths.
As a consequence, we need to assess the counterfactual GHG emissions that would have
occurred if the KP would have not been adopted for each country with binding emission
target under the KP and compare these to the actual GHG emissions. The resulting
difference is a measure of the effectiveness of the KP in the sense that it indicates how
much GHG emissions have been abated due to the adoption of binding emission targets
within the framework of the KP. Thus, we consider the adoption of binding emission
targets under the KP (contingent on later ratification) as a “treatment” and ask what
was the effect of this treatment. To answer this question it is crucial that there are other
countries which did not receive the treatment. In our case these are all the countries
which do not have any binding obligations with respect to GHG emissions reductions
under the KP. If all countries were equal in all respect apart from receiving the treatment
or not, the treatment effect would simply be given by the difference in GHG emissions of
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treated and non-treated countries. Of course, not all countries are alike. Even worse, there
is a clear selection bias with respect to the treatment: only Annex B countries – which
roughly equals to the industrialized world – face a binding GHG emission target.6 As a
consequence, we have to employ more sophisticated methods to measure the treatment
effect.
3 Empirical Analysis
We analyze the effect of being committed to an emission target under the KP for the
major GHG emitters. Out of the top ten GHG emitting countries, accounting for ap-
proximately 82% of total baseline emissions of countries with binding emission targets
under the KP, we dropped the 3 Eastern European countries Poland, Russia and the
Ukraine for two reasons. First, at the time of adoption of the KP in 1997, these coun-
tries exhibited emission levels far below their emissions target due to the severe economic
downturn during the 1990s which followed the breakdown of the Former Soviet Union
(FSU). As these countries were not expected to reach emissions levels at or even above
their Kyoto targets in the near future – despite their economic recovery –, they had little
economic incentives to reduce emissions. Second, reliable data for these countries is only
available since the breakdown of the FSU. The remaining seven countries are Australia,
Canada, France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Japan which are still responsible
for approximately 44% of total baseline GHG emissions of the countries with binding
emission targets under the KP.
3.1 Data
The data used in the present paper stems from two different sources. Data on all en-
vironmental, economic and structural variables are taken from the World Development
Indicators published by the World Bank.7 Additional information on the KP stems from
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).8 Table 1
show the summary statistics for all data used in the empirical analysis.
6 In March 2001 the USA, despite signing the KP, announced not to ratify. As a consequence, we consider
the USA as “non-treated”, i.e. a country without a binding GHG emission target under the KP. In
fact, the USA is the only Annex B country which did not eventually ratify the KP.
7 Visited online at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog.
8 Visited online at: http://unfccc.int.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Non-Annex B
MANU 11928621509.443 82705616850.213 773839.759 1614700000000 2622
ALNU 5.16 10.511 0 119.449 2336
EPKW 70140702482.877 357438570691.998 7000000 4147708000000 2336
EPEU 62524.958 200521.584 0 1697347 2336
EUEU 54353.663 229364.539 28 2310961 2336
CO2 85190.464 474493.211 3.664 5793205.36 3863
COIN 2.146 1.257 0.021 13.267 2302
GDPC 6154.154 9120.411 150.807 95434.183 3218
POPT 26660692.466 114490967.061 7519 1296075000 4257
INFL 49.098 560.718 -100 23773.132 2825
Annex B
TARG 0.965 0.11 0.72 1.27 925
MANU 66139216422.94 151990394256.496 531009733.305 1072629923305.696 485
ALNU 15.685 16.62 0 75.664 820
EPKW 152961097560.976 219231222045.182 358000000 1082152000000 820
EPEU 71621.874 153729.911 26 1280255 820
EUEU 89873.838 130951.932 1497 870002 820
CO2 231551.234 384389.932 1546.208 2548101.457 889
COIN 2.452 0.652 0.648 4.067 809
GDPC 20531.948 9806.405 3429.97 65798.529 820
POPT 23430613.824 33251078.658 25207 148689000 925
INFL 35.979 224.01 -13.845 4734.914 747
Note: TARG: Greenhouse Gas emission target (% of base year); MANU: Manufacturing, value added (constant
2000 US$); ALNU: Alternative and nuclear energy (% of total energy use); EPKW: Electricity production (kWh);
EPEU: Energy production (kt of oil equivalent); EUEU: Energy use (kt of oil equivalent); CO2: CO2 emissions
(kt); COIN: CO2 intensity (kg per kg of oil equivalent energy use); GDPC: GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005
international $); POPT: Population, total; INFL: Inflation, consumer prices (annual %).
We face two challenges inherent in the KP and the global scope of the problem. First, the
KP allows for flexibility mechanisms such as Emissions Trading (ET), Joint Implementa-
tion (JI), and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). By trading emission permits
(ET) or joint emission reduction projects (JI) treated countries would affect each others’
GHG emissions, implying that the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA)
would be violated. In addition, treated countries would affect the emissions of countries
in the control group via CDM projects. As a result, affected non-treated countries would
have to be excluded from the control group. Therefore, flexibility mechanisms may harm
the identification of the targeted treatment effect. In order to prevent biased estimates,
we limit the analysis to 2004, as from 2005 onward several flexibility mechanisms be-
came important. For instance, the EU emissions trading system (EU-ETS) started in
2005. Moreover, the clean development mechanism (CDM) was virtually non-existent
until 2005, after which the number of credited projects skyrocketed.9 As we consider
the adoption of the KP in December 1997 as the treatment event (see Section 2), we
9 See the UNEP RISO Centre database available online at: http://cdmpipeline.org.
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analyze the effect of the targets for the period from 1998 to 2004 using 1980 to 1997 as
the pre-intervention period. As an additional robustness check, we also estimated our
models with an extended post-intervention period including 2008, although results have
to be treated with caution due to the use of flexibility mechanisms (see Section 3.4.2).
Second, as a response to the binding emission targets, treated countries may decrease
the domestic production of “dirty goods” and increase their imports from non-treated
countries. This response would affect emissions of both treated and non-treated countries
and such a bias can neither be quantified nor excluded from the analysis.10 As this
interference would lead to a clear overestimation of the treatment effect,11 this problem
only applies to the UK, the only country for which we find a significant treatment effect.
Obviously, reducing GHG emissions against BAU emissions is not a one shot decision
but an ongoing process over time: incentives for reducing GHG emissions have to be
incorporated into national legislation and the energy sector has to adjust to these new
circumstances (Olmstead and Stavins 2007). Thus, one expects that countries willing
to put serious effort into reducing GHG emissions gradually diverge from their BAU
emission paths. This view is supported by the KP itself, which explicitly states:
• §3(2): Each Party included in Annex B shall, by 2005, have made demonstrable
progress in achieving its commitments under this Protocol.
• §6(1,d): The acquisition of emission reduction units shall be supplemental to do-
mestic actions for the purposes of meeting commitments under Article 3.
Thus, compliance with the KP not only involves noticeable efforts until 2005, but also
limits the use of flexible mechanisms to fulfill the emission target under the KP.
Another obstacle to the analysis is that data on the emissions of the six greenhouse gases
controlled under the KP is only available for Annex B countries. As a consequence, we
use CO2 emissions as a proxy for GHG emissions in our analysis. This is justified by the
fact that CO2 emissions are by far the most important GHG, as they amount for more
than 80% of total GHG emissions worldwide (82.8% in 2007, see UNFCCC). Moreover,
the correlation between CO2 and other GHG emissions for all countries for which we
10 The carbon content of traded goods is not subject of our analysis, as it is not regulated under the KP.
See Aichele and Felbermayr (2011) for further discussion on this topic.
11 The import of “dirty goods” would reduce domestic GHG emissions for the importing (Annex B)
countries while at the same time increase emissions of the exporting (non-Annex B) countries. As
a consequence, emissions of non-treated countries would increase due to the KP leading to a higher
counterfactual emission path. Thus, the difference between the two (the biased treatment effect) would
be larger than the true treatment effect.
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have data on the latter is about 0.90. In order to render countries more comparable, we
construct what we call proportional targets, which is CO2 emissions in 1990 multiplied
by the emission target of the KP in percent.
3.2 Differences-in-Differences, Synthetic Controls and Causal Inference
It is the aim of the present paper to elicit the treatment effect of being committed
to a specific emission target under the KP. The classical matching literature calls this
the (average) treatment effect on the treated (ATT) (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). The
main challenge for estimating such an effect is that the researcher is confronted with a
missing data problem (Rubin 1976). Obviously, one cannot observe the same country at
the same time having both a binding emission target and no emission target. In order to
overcome this problem one could compare the average CO2 emissions of countries with
targets to those that have none. However, as we have to deal with observational data, the
researcher cannot randomly assign treatment, as it would be necessary for this approach
to yield valid results. In our case it is most probably true that countries with (I) and
without (N) binding emission targets may differ systematically with respect to their
emissions (Y ). One important consequence is that the assignment of emission targets
cannot be treated as ignorable (Rubin 1976, 1978, 2005). More formally this implies
Pr(I|Y (0), Y (1)) 6= Pr(I|Y ) , (1)
where (0) 1 indicate the outcome in case of (no) treatment (Rubin 1976). Therefore, one
cannot simply regress Y on a dummy for I together with some covariates in order to
estimate the treatment effect for country i at time t (Abadie et al. 2010), i.e.
αit = Y
I
it − Y
N
it , (2)
as the level of Y may itself influence I.
There are several potential strategies to solve this problem (Imbens and Wooldridge
2009). In cases as ours, where different groups are either exposed or not exposed to
some kind of treatment over a certain time period, the most often applied method
is the differences-in-differences (DD) estimation (Bertrand et al. 2004). More recently
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) introduced a synthetic con-
trol method that originates from the case study literature. It allows for high levels of
flexibility when estimating treatment effects for the above mentioned setup.
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In our opinion, the synthetic control approach exhibits two key advantages over the DD
estimation which renders it particularly suitable for the present research question. First,
the synthetic control method allows to estimate the counterfactual emissions path for
every single country and every year following the adoption of the KP. Thus, we do not
only get an average effect for all countries under investigation, but we are also able to
account for country-specific developments and characteristics. For example, the treat-
ment is very heterogenous as targets range from 79% (Germany) to 108% (Australia) for
the countries under investigation. Second, as countries are analyzed separately, different
countries may be matched with respect to different characteristics. This is important, as
emissions and emission reductions may have different underlying causes.
In what follows, we first apply traditional DD and Panel estimators to quantify the
treatment effect for KP emission targets for all countries in our dataset. However, we
shall argue that due to several shortcomings of the available data it is not advisable to
interpret these results as the real treatment effects. We then apply the synthetic control
method and contrast our findings with respect to the DD and Panel estimates.
3.3 Difference-in-Difference and Panel Estimates
The most straightforward approach to analyze a treatment effect if treated and non-
treated groups differ and data stretches from some time prior to the treatment (pre-
intervention period) to some time past the treatment (post-intervention period) is to ap-
ply differences-in-differences (DD) estimation (Ashenfelter 1978, Ashenfelter and Card
1985). In its simplest form with two groups and two periods it can be written as:
π = (Y11 − Y10)− (Y01 − Y00) , (3)
where Y10 (Y00) and Y11 (Y01) denote the outcome of the treated (non-treated or control)
group before and after the treatment. Likewise, the DD approach can be expressed as a
regression of the type
Yit = α+ γDt + δGi + π Gi · Tt + ǫit , (4)
where i and t denote unit and time, D is a dummy variable equal to one in the post-
treatment period and G is a dummy variable equal to one if a unit is exposed to the
treatment. Then, the parameter estimate π of the interaction term is the DD estimate
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Table 2: Differences-in-Differences (DD) estimates for the treatment effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treatment -0.302 -0.325 -0.157 -0.00310 -0.00138 -0.0000782
(0.001) (0.004) (0.052) (0.488) (0.780) (0.989)
N 4752 4102 4027 2332 1794 1752
R2, adjusted 0.212 0.190 0.137 0.996 0.997 0.997
Note: p-values in parentheses. Columns 1–3 present OLS estimates with clustered standard errors using the
approach in equation (4). Columns 4–6 display results for equation (5) with robust standard errors including
time and year fixed effects and several covariates (GDP per capita, percentage of alternative and nuclear energy
consumption, GDP per unit of energy use, CO2 intensity, total population). Columns 1 and 4 show results for all
available observations, columns 2 and 5 for 10 selected Annex B countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, Russia and the Ukraine), and columns 3 and 6 for the subset of seven Annex
B countries that we analyze in Section 3.4.
of the treatment effect. Table 2 shows DD estimates of the form presented in equation
(4) in columns 1–3.
However, this basic DD estimator does neither account for the panel structure of our
data nor for any covariates. Controlling for both results in a panel data model of the
type
Yit = α+ βXit + Fi + Tt + πGi · Tt + ǫit , (5)
which is, in general, estimated via first differences or fixed-effects (within transformation)
estimation. In addition to the model of equation (4), this specification includes unit and
time fixed-effects F and T , as well as a vector of covariates X. Again, the estimate for
π is the treatment effect (Galiani et al. 2005). Results for this specification are shown in
columns 4–6 of Table 2.12
We find a significant and negative effect of KP targets for our basic DD specification in
columns 1–3 independent of the subset of investigated countries. The estimates range
from around -.15 to -.3. However, including covariates and accounting for the panel
structure, as done in columns 4–6, the effects drop both in economic and statistical
significance. In fact, we find no evidence for a significant impact of the KP targets
on CO2 emissions on the basis of the results obtained so far. Moreover, the pattern is
similar to Aichele and Felbermayr (2011), as both estimates and significance levels drop
12 In addition to the presented estimates, we also applied an unconfoundedness-based approach
as suggested by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), a panel approach including AR(1) disturbances
(Baltagi and Wu 1999) and difference GMM (Arellano and Bond 1991) accounting for potential per-
sistency of the dependent variable. However, none of these approaches yielded significantly different
results and are available from the authors upon request.
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markable when Eastern European countries are excluded (see the differences for columns
2 and 3 and columns 5 and 6, respectively).
This model could be further extended to allow for time-varying or group-varying effects,
serial correlation, etc.13 However, we argue that for a cross-country dataset of the present
type, where effects are expected to vary drastically across countries and years, and
characteristics of countries influencing CO2 emissions may be heterogenous, traditional
regression based approaches may be problematic.
3.4 Synthetic Control Method
We account for the particular characteristics of the present dataset and the research ques-
tion addressed in this paper by employing the synthetic control approach developed by
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010). In fact, we separately estimate
the treatment effect of seven selected Annex B countries for each of which a weighted
average of control countries serves as an estimate for the counterfactual outcome without
the treatment. We argue that this approach is preferable to more traditional estimation
methods because it allows for considerable flexibility and can be tailored for each country
under investigation. This is of particular importance in our context, as not only treated
and non-treated countries are heterogenous but there are also considerable differences
among the treated countries in relevant aspects.
To estimate the counterfactuals for Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, Germany,
Italy and Japan we separate the countries for which sufficient information is available
in two distinct sets. The first set – the group of treated countries under investigation
– consists of these seven Annex B countries with binding emission targets. The second
set – the so called donor pool (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003, Abadie et al. 2010) –
consists of all other countries without having binding targets. These are all non-Annex
B countries plus the U.S. which did not ratify the KP. We sequentially draw the seven
countries from the treated pool and use a synthetic control approach to create the
specific counterfactual country via a convex combination of all countries in the donor
pool. We follow Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) in keeping the
restriction of no extrapolation. To increase the comparability of countries we transform
all data to an index with 1990 as the base year (Cavallo et al. 2010).
13 See, for example, Bertrand et al. (2004) and Hansen (2007a,b). For an overview of recent developments,
see Imbens and Wooldridge (2009).
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For the general case in which Y Nit denote the emissions of country i at time t without
treatment (N), and accordingly, Y Iit with treatment (I), the treatment effect would be
described by equation (2). Now suppose that there are J + 1 countries where J = 1
denotes the treated country – which, in our case, corresponds to a binding emission
target under the KP – and j = 2, . . . , J+1 are all untreated countries in the donor pool.
For the treated country we have data about the actual emission path (Y I1t), but we are
ignorant about the counterfactual emissions which would have occurred if this country
would not have been subject to the treatment (Y N1t for t > 1997). Thus, we have to find
an estimate for Y N1t in order to obtain an estimate for the treatment effect α1t:
α1t = Y1t − Y
N
1t . (6)
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) propose to make use of the
observed characteristics of the countries in the donor pool. The underlying idea is to
find weights W = (ω2, ..., ωJ+1)
′, with ωj ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , J + 1 and
∑J+1
j=2 ωj = 1,
such that the weighted average of all countries in the donor pool resembles the treated
country with respect to GHG emissions in the pre-intervention period and all other
relevant aspects (Z). Formally, we seek W such that:14
J+1∑
j=2
ω⋆jYjt = Y1t for all t < T0 and
J+1∑
j=2
ω⋆jZj = Z1 . (7)
Then
∑J+1
j=2 ω
⋆
jYjt for t ≥ T0 is an estimate for the unobserved counterfactual emissions
path Y N1t , and we obtain the following estimate for the treatment effect:
α̂1t = Y1t −
J+1∑
j=2
ω⋆jYjt , t ≥ T0 . (8)
In general, a vector W such that equations (7) hold may not exist (in particular, if the
weights wj ≥ 0 and, thus, extrapolation is prohibited). However, one can choose the
weights such as to
min
W
(X1 −X0W )
′V (X1 −X0W ) , (9)
where X1 denotes a (k × 1) vector of pre-intervention characteristics of the treated
country, which may include the pre-intervention emission path, and X0 denotes a (k×J)
matrix of the same variables for the J countries in the donor pool. The symmetric and
14 In our case 1980 ≤ t ≤ 2004 and the pre-intervention period T0 is 1980 ≤ T0 ≤ 1997.
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positive definite matrix V weights the relative importance of the various characteristics
included in X. Obviously, the optimal weights W depend on the weighting matrix V .
We follow Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) in choosing V such that the difference of
the pre-intervention emission path of the treated country and its synthetic counterpart
is minimized. For further discussion on the synthetic control method including several
extensions, see Abadie et al. (2010).
As the synthetic control method itself does not provide standard errors to infer statistical
significance, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) suggest to run
placebo or permutation tests. The underlying idea is to predict counterfactual emission
paths for countries in the donor pool, i.e., for countries without any treatment.15 If and
only if the gap between the actual emission path and the predicted one is the largest for
the country where the treatment really occurred, then one can say that its development
is “significantly” different from the business-as-usual scenario (Abadie and Gardeazabal
2003, Abadie et al. 2010).16 In addition, in Figures 7–9 in the appendix we report results
on the root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE) ratio as in Abadie et al. (2010),
and “p-values”, as suggested by Cavallo et al. (2010).
3.4.1 Results
In Figures 2–4 we show the results for the seven countries under investigation. For
each country we plot the predicted counterfactual and the actual emission paths for
1980 ≤ t ≤ 2004. In addition, the graphs show results for the placebo tests, as mentioned
above. Additional information on the chosen characteristics X0 and X1, weights W , the
predictor balance and the root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE) are given in the
appendix.
The results are unambiguous for Australia, Canada and Italy. Neither do the predicted
emission paths deviate from the actual ones in any considerable amount nor does the
inference analysis show any kind of higher gap between actual and predicted paths
of these countries relative to donor countries. Thus, the findings do not support the
hypothesis that the Kyoto agreement did change emissions of Australia, Canada and
Italy until 2004. For Japan predicted CO2 emissions are even below actual emissions,
15 For the inference analysis we draw a random sample of 20 countries from the donor pool, while keeping
the same elements for X.
16 Alternatively, one could employ a time series approach based on the actual and predicted outcome, as
proposed by Hsiao et al. (forthcoming).
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Figure 2: Synthetic matching and permutation tests for Australia, Great Britain and
Canada
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Note: For the synthetic control approach (left) the horizontal line indicates the proportional target as agreed
on in the KP and the vertical line indicates the year of the the KP adoption (1997). For the permutation tests
(right) the thick line indicates the gap of the treated country (actual emissions minus synthetic emission) while
the dashed lines indicate the corresponding gaps for the random sample of donor countries.
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Figure 3: Synthetic matching and permutation tests for France, Germany and Italy
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
1.
1
1.
2
1.
3
1.
4
1.
5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
_time
FRA synthetic FRA
−
1
−
.5
0
.5
1
ga
p
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
_time
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
1.
1
1.
2
1.
3
1.
4
1.
5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
_time
DEU synthetic DEU
−
1.
5
−
1
−
.5
0
.5
ga
p
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
_time
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
1.
1
1.
2
1.
3
1.
4
1.
5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
_time
ITA synthetic ITA
−
1.
5
−
1
−
.5
0
.5
ga
p
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
_time
Note: For the synthetic control approach (left) the horizontal line indicates the proportional target as agreed on
in the KP and the vertical line indicates the year of the KP adoption (1997). For the permutation tests (right) the
thick line indicates the gap of the treated country (actual emissions minus synthetic emission) while the dashed
lines indicate the corresponding gaps for the random sample of donor countries.
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Figure 4: Synthetic matching and permutation tests for Japan
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Note: For the synthetic control approach (left) the horizontal line indicates the proportional target as agreed
on in the KP and the vertical line indicates the year of the the KP adoption (1997). For the permutation tests
(right) the thick line indicates the gap of the treated country (actual emissions minus synthetic emission) while
the dashed lines indicate the corresponding gaps for the random sample of donor countries.
indicating a negative treatment effect (see left of Figure 4). However, this effect is not
significant according to the inference analysis shown in Figure 4 (right).
France shows a very specific development of CO2 emissions (Figure 3, top left). We ob-
serve a considerable decrease during the 1980s and a fluctuating development thereafter.
In fact, it turned out to be challenging to match the CO2 emissions of France with those
of other countries. In order to keep the RMSPE in a considerable range, we restricted
the period over which the RMSPE is minimized to 1988–1997. In doing so, we find a
sizeable difference between actual and synthetic emissions (see top left of Figure 3).
However, also being at the outskirts of the cloud generated by the placebo study, Figure
3 (top right) does not show a significantly different gap for France relative to its donor
countries.
Also Germany shows a specific development of CO2 emissions as a result of the reuni-
fication in 1990 and the accompanied collapse of (dirty) industries in the eastern part.
Germany shows an emission path similar to France. There is considerable deviation of
the counterfactual predicted path from the observed path in Figure 3 (middle left), but
the placebo study in Figure 3 (middle right) renders this result insignificant.
We also find a different development for the synthetic Great Britain and the actual Great
Britain (see middle left of Figure 2). In 2004 Great Britain’s CO2 emissions would have
been approximately 30 percent higher in the absence of the KP emissions target. Looking
at the corresponding inference analysis in Figure 2 (middle right) there is some evidence
that the gap between the actual and synthetic Great Britain is exceptional relative to
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the placebo study (except for one obvious outlier). Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the Kyoto Protocol target did reduce Great Britain’s GHG emissions. This result is
also supported by the RMSPE ratios and the “p-values” (see Figure 8 in the appendix).
3.4.2 Robustness Checks
In the following, we show that our results are robust to a variety of setup-alterations.
Significant treatment effect for the UK
As the UK is the only country for which there is a significant treatment effect we em-
ployed several alternative specifications. First, we re-estimated the counterfactual emis-
sion path for the UK excluding the USA from the donor pool. One might argue that
the synthetic UK is driven by a very specific emission path of the USA (weight: .449).
However, results remain robust and can be found in Figure 5 (left).
By design, the KP exhibits a clear selection bias between treated (roughly the devel-
oped world) and non-treated countries (rest of the world). One might question whether
developing countries are useful in constructing synthetic counterfactuals for developed
countries. In fact, out of the 20 countries chosen from the donor pool to match the seven
countries under consideration, only six countries are considered as lower and lower mid-
dle income countries according to the World Bank classification. As another robustness
check, however, we re-ran the analysis for the UK restricting the donor pool to countries
classified as high and upper middle income countries. The treatment effect remained
robust – although it is less significant – and is displayed in Figure 5 (right).
Extended treatment period
As discussed in Section 3.1, the use of flexibility mechanisms such as emissions trading,
joint implementation and clean development mechanism blurs the distinction among
the different treated countries and also the distinction between treated and non-treated
countries. In consequence, we restricted the treatment period from 1998 to 2004. How-
ever, the first commitment period under the KP ranges from 2008 to 2012. Thus, it is
certainly of interest to have some information on the treatment effect after 2005. As
a consequence, we ran the synthetic control method for an extended treatment period
18
Figure 5: Robustness Checks for the UK: Excluding the USA (left) and the USA and
developing countries (right) from the donor pool.
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Note: The horizontal axis displays the gap between the synthetic and actual emission path for the UK (i.e., the
treatment effect for the post-intervention period) and the vertical line indicates the year of the KP adoption
(1997).
ranging from 1998 to (and including) 2008. However, one should keep in mind that result
may be biased between 2005–2008.
Results for the extended treatment period show the same pattern as the benchmark
results for Australia, Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany and Japan. Qualitatively,
the results are the same as for the original post-intervention period (results available on
request). For Italy (Figure 6), however, results change for the period 2005–2008 as we
do find a treatment effect in the years 2007 and 2008. However, the inference analysis
renders this treatment effect insignificant.
4 Discussion
The DD estimates show significant treatment effects for all investigated sample sizes if
we do not control for any covariates and the panel structure in our data. Accounting
for GDP per capita, percentage of alternative and nuclear energy consumption, GDP
per unit of energy use, CO2 intensity, total population, and including country and year
fixed-effects the treatment effect remains negative but becomes insignificant. This result
is supported by our synthetic control analysis. In summary, we can rule out significant
treatment effects for the six countries Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and
Japan, and we find a clear treatment effect for Great Britain.
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Figure 6: Synthetic matching and permutation tests for Italy for an extended treatment
period 1998 to 2008
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Note: For the synthetic control approach (left) the horizontal line indicates the proportional target as agreed
on in the KP and the vertical line indicates the year of the the KP adoption (1997). For the permutation tests
(right) the thick line indicates the gap of the treated country (actual emissions minus synthetic emission) while
the dashed lines indicate the corresponding gaps for the random sample of donor countries.
Our results clearly show the advantage of the synthetic control method over the tradi-
tional differences-in-differences (DD) approach in eliciting the causal effect of binding
emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol (KP). Despite the clear selection bias in the
treated and non-treated group, we are able to construct counterfactual emissions paths
for all seven countries under investigation, which reasonably match the observed emis-
sions in the pre-treatment period. This is not only evident from the graphs in Figures 2,
3 and 4 but also from the small root mean square prediction errors (RMSPE) shown in
the appendix.
Another advantage over the traditional DD approach is that treatment effects can be
estimated for each country individually. This allows to individually tailor the counterfac-
tual synthetic country to the idiosyncracies of each treated country (i.e., the individual
emission target). In fact, the table in the appendix shows that we not only used different
variables to be matched for the seven countries but also that the countries chosen from
the donor pool to construct the counterfactual country differ considerably among the
seven countries. In total 20 countries were chosen from the donor pool to match all seven
treated countries.
Our results also fit well with the assessment of the “demonstrable progress reports” all
Annex B countries with binding emissions targets under the KP had to compose in
order to report about their emissions reductions progress until 2005 and the planned
measures to achieve compliance with the KP targets over the commitment period from
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2008–2012.17 Australia did not submit such a progress report, as it only ratified the KP
in 2007. In addition, the former Australian government strictly opposed ratification of
the KP as it feared economic consequences from emissions reductions. In fact, Australia
experienced the fifth highest greenhouse gas emissions per capita in 2005 according to
the World Resources Institute. Therefore, it is not surprising that up to 2004 Australia’s
CO2 emissions followed a business-as-usual path. In its progress report Canada admitted
its weak progress towards complying with the KP target, despite substantial (and costly)
policy measures and strong support from the general public. Canada claims its national
peculiarities of high population growth, strong economic growth and very drastic growth
in the natural resource sector are at least partly to blame. As a result, on December 12th
2011 Peter Kent, the environment minister, announced that Canada will contract out
of the protocol. Also Japan and Italy admit that their progress with respect to emission
restrictions is unsatisfactory. Although they promised to comply with the KP, they plan
to achieve this rather by means of the flexible mechanisms under the KP and less due to
own emission reductions. France reported to be close to its KP target. France claims that
this success is due to its climate action plan, in which the government and the private
sector agreed on even more ambitious abatement targets. Germany reported to be on the
right track (17.4% reduction of GHG emissions in 2004 compared to 1990). Apart from
the re-unification and the associated collapse of the “dirty” industry in former Eastern
Germany, Germany profitted from an aggressive promotion of renewable energies the
total output of which triplicated from 1990 to 2004. Also Great Britain stated its full
support of the KP and reported a drop of 14.6% of GHG emissions compared to base
year levels.18 In fact, Great Britain exhibits demanding complementary climate change
policies. It has adopted a domestic goal to reduce 20% of CO2 emissions by 2010 against
1990, and a long-term goal of a 60% reduction until 2050.
5 Conclusion
The Kyoto Protocol (KP) has been widely criticized by the public press and the scientific
community alike. In particular, issues concerning equity, efficiency and cost-effectiveness
have been raised. In this paper, we asked in how far the KP lived up to its primary goal,
the reduction of domestic GHG emissions in the industrialized world. To answer this
question, we analyzed the development of CO2 emissions for seven major GHG emitters
with binding emission targets under the KP with a synthetic control approach. With
17 Available online at: http://unfccc.int
18 However, these 14.6% included accountable emission changes due to changes in land use.
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the exception of Great Britain, we find little evidence for a significant treatment effect,
i.e., countries with binding emissions targets did not emit less CO2 over the period from
1998–2004 than they would have if they would not have been subject to emission targets
under the KP.
In light of these findings and the additional concerns raised by other authors, we doubt
that a continuation of the KP in its present form – even if extended to include countries
in transition – is advisable. As a consequence, we see the focus on domestic actions
rather as a dead end than a last resort for future climate policy. Instead we follow
Prins and Rayner (2007) and Olmstead and Stavins (2007) in their advice to completely
rethink the necessities of an international environmental agreement and to implement
an according architecture. Of course, as the last climate negotiations proved markedly,
this is easier to be said than done.
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Appendix
The following tables give additional information on the chosen weightsW , the predictor balance,
and the root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE) for the synthetic controls of the seven
countries under investigation.
Australia
RMSPE 0.0157732
Elements of X Treated Synthetic Country Codes Weights
CO2 ind(1993) 1.0400455 1.0398973 CYP .042
CO2 ind(1995) 1.0592113 1.0616889 GAB .01
CO2 ind(1997) 1.1396776 1.1392478 JAM .034
GDPC ind .95673891 .96864245 MEX .314
COIN ind .97256694 .97287455 TUR .207
POPT ind .9745784 .97723708 USA .296
INFL ind .81604636 1.2218789 ZWE .097
POPT ind(1998(1)2004) 1.1374694 1.174411
INFL ind(1998(1)2004) .37898272 1.300556
Great Britain
RMSPE 0.0223088
Elements of X Treated Synthetic Country Codes Weights
CO2 ind(1985) .98182636 1.0067237 JAM .048
CO2 ind(1986) .99747264 .95787756 NGA .078
CO2 ind(1991) 1.0413698 1.0290785 TTO .189
CO2 ind(1996) 1.0183473 1.0154383 USA .449
CO2 ind(1997) .97193569 .99989701 ZAR .236
EPKW ind .96853412 .95257611
EUEU ind .9966448 .95896528
GDPC ind .94068872 .99119126
COIN ind .99882423 1.0539675
POPT ind .99770882 .98490668
Canada
RMSPE 0.0238689
Elements of X Treated Synthetic Country Codes Weights
CO2 ind(1993) 1.0623691 1.0400123 COL .055
CO2 ind(1996) 1.0395643 1.0534184 ECU .05
CO2 ind(1997) 1.0736697 1.0794488 GAB .035
ALNU ind 1.0127441 .97235728 JAM .147
EPKW ind 1.0061366 .97733622 NGA .026
EPEU ind(1980(1)1989) .84987291 .81756977 USA .381
EPEU ind(1990(1)1997) 1.1776673 1.0920899 VEN .216
EUEU ind .99413004 .9836014 ZAR .09
GDPC ind .95733257 .98738612
COIN ind .97520806 .98097175
POPT ind .9800609 .97999068
POPT ind(1998(1)2004) 1.1187162 1.2026673
25
France
RMSPE 0.0292088
Elements of X Treated Synthetic Country Codes Weights
CO2 ind(1988(1)1992) .99571389 .98722841 DZA .257
CO2 ind(1993) .97513235 .97499269 ECU .068
CO2 ind(1997) .95102745 .96936102 JAM .093
ALNU ind(1991(1)1995) 1.088621 1.089297 MEX .158
EPKW ind(1985(1)1997) 1.0413793 1.039848 SDN .04
EPEU ind(1990(1)1997) 1.1060159 1.0667473 ZAR .253
EUEU ind(1991(1)1997) 1.0610689 1.0816054 ZWE .13
GDPC ind(1988(1)1992) .98991762 .98892533
GDPC ind(1993(1)1997) 1.0335018 .89109397
COIN ind(1990(1)1997) .94128588 .92026878
POPT ind .98987935 .96578784
POPT ind(2000(1)2004) 1.0517759 1.2725568
INFL ind(2000) .50277597 2.2533562
Germany
RMSPE 0.0331868
Elements of X Treated Synthetic Country Codes Weights
CO2 ind(1986) 1.0394883 1.0197482 ALB .212
CO2 ind(1991(1)1995) .87298849 .87563997 USA .535
CO2 ind(1996) .87724149 .83560834 ZMB .252
CO2 ind(1997) .85190731 .89189575
GDPC ind .95186213 .97540854
EUEU ind(1980(1)1985) .98298825 .93133672
EUEU ind(1992(1)1996) .96303115 .94764451
EUEU ind(1997) .9828915 .97712421
COIN ind(1980(1)1985) 1.0596507 1.1143252
COIN ind(1992(1)1996) .89872442 .87191304
COIN ind(1997) .86440253 .85399082
POPT ind .99983214 .97052172
POPT ind(1998(1)2004) 1.0363492 1.1498978
AGVA ind(2000) 1.1350716 1.3083242
INFL ind(2000) .85360497 .83313191
Italy
RMSPE 0.020173
Elements of X Treated Synthetic Country Codes Weights
CO2 ind(1993) .99436677 .99110729 DZA .059
CO2 ind(1996) 1.0077037 1.0237655 JAM .085
CO2 ind(1997) 1.0166065 1.042118 MEX .276
ALNU ind 1.2725586 1.0271518 USA .419
EPKW ind .9662771 .95543326 ZAR .158
EPEU ind(1980(1)1989) .90813811 .88838576 ZWE .002
EPEU ind(1990(1)1997) 1.1187532 1.0342123
EUEU ind .96096949 .96101172
GDPC ind .94072787 .97508264
COIN ind .9835916 .98390632
POPT ind .99934022 .98071053
POPT ind(1998(1)2004) 1.0092339 1.1972574
26
Japan
RMSPE 0.0213998
Elements of X Treated Synthetic Country Codes Weights
CO2 ind(1995) 1.0796613 1.0734271 ALB .024
CO2 ind(1996) 1.0990455 1.1056268 CUB .114
CO2 ind(1997) 1.1003619 1.1082995 JAM .149
ALNU ind .98048224 1.010609 PRK .16
EPKW ind .92501628 .96125783 THA .041
EUEU ind .93768214 .93935736 USA .513
COIN ind 1.0105633 1.0173347
POPT ind .98967067 .98717783
POPT ind(1998(1)2004) 1.029192 1.1177278
Figure 7: RMSPE ratios and p-values for Japan
0
5
10
15
D
en
si
ty
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
RMSPE ratio
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
pv
al
ue
1998 2000 2002 2004
_time
Note: The left graph displays the histogram of the RMSPE ratio for 21 countries (treated plus placebo). The
dashed line indicates the RMPSE ratio for the treated country under investigation (Japan). The RMPSE ratio
is computed by dividing the RMSPE after the treatment by the RMSPE prior to the treatment for each country
(Abadie et al. 2010). If and only if the treated country stands out in terms of the size of the ratio (dashed line
at the right end of the graph) one can interpret this as evidence for a "significant" treatment effect. For the right
graph we follow the approach proposed by Cavallo et al. (2010) and calculate "p-values" for the significance of the
treatment effect for each post-intervention year. The exact formula is given by:
p-valuel =
∑J+1
j=2
I(α̂
PL(j)
1,l
> α̂1,l)
J
(10)
and α̂
PL(j)
1,l
being the estimated effect of placebo (PL) country j at time l after the treatment. Similarly, α̂1,l is
the estimated treatment effect of country 1 at time l.
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Figure 8: RMSPE ratios and p-values for Australia, Great Britain and Canada
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Figure 9: RMSPE ratios and p-values for France, Germany and Italy
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